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Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment
BY NEIL P. COHEN AND DEAN HILL RIVKIN*

a dormant area of active social concern,
HE
in the
Nation's
haveCONDITIONS
recently come
under
sharpprisons,
public long
censure and penetrating legal scrutiny. As the result
of this increased interest, correctional officials
have brought about some progressive reforms
which have kindled the ancient hope that the
recidivism rate will decline. Unfortunately, those
who harbor such beliefs often overlook the superstructure of statutory and regulatory disabilities
that adversely affect the criminal offender's rehabilitation both during his time in prison and,
perhaps more crucially, after his release. These
"civil disabilities," imposed by every state and
the Federal Government upon many convicted
offenders, may deprive these persons of such
privileges as voting, holding public office, obtaining many jobs and occupational licenses, entering
judicially enforceable instruments, serving as a
juror or fiduciary, maintaining family relationships, obtaining insurance and pension benefits,
and many others. Despite the widespread enactment of civil disability laws, until recently there
had been no comprehensive study of the extent
and effect of civil disabilities in the United States.
In an effort to examine this virtually virgin
area of peno-correctional law, the Vanderbilt
Law Review published a comprehensive survey
and evaluation of the civil consequences of a
criminal conviction. 1 The results of this study,
partly summarized below, emphasize the neglect
and lack of commitment the public, through its
elected representatives, has shown toward the
rehabilitation of convicted offenders. This oversight is especially significant today since many
convicted criminals are young offenders being
punished for their encounters with drugs, civil
rights, or the military. This group will join all
other ex-convicts in being forever shackled with
the stigma of their conviction until a massive
restructuring of the collateral consequences of
* Mr. Cohen was the special projects and research
editor of the special issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review
(October 1970) on which this article is based. He is at
present law clerk to Judge William E. Miller of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Mr. Rivkin is research and book review editor of the
Vanderbilt Law Review.

criminal conviction is undertaken by the courts
and legislatures.
Civil disabilities are not the product of American jurisprudence. Convicted persons were saddled with civil disabilities in both ancient Greece
and Rome. English law, reflecting a Roman heritage and certain fiscal and philosophical considerations, imposed civil disabilities through "attainder." The attained criminal generally forfeiting
his civil and proprietary rights, became "civilly
dead." American jurisprudence blindly followed
the English tradition and adopted a host of
civil disability laws. Thirteen states retain
various parts of the concept of civil death, including, in some states, the general loss of civil
rights. Every other state and the Federal Government have enacted specific disability provisions
that deprive convicted persons of various rights
and privileges.
Every convicted person, however, is not within
the purview of the civil disability laws. Most such
statutes are applicable only when the offender
has been "convicted" of a crime. This requirement
may pose problems when judgment and sentence
have not been imposed and when the offender
appeals his conviction. Similarly, civil disability
laws apply only to certain crimes. While perhaps
most provisions apply to convictions for a
"felony," others require the offense to be an
"infamous crime" or a crime "involving moral
turpitude." The use of such broad classes of
crimes presents two problems. First, it may be
difficult to ascertain whether a particular crime
is within a certain class of crimes. Secondly, the
class may include more crimes than are necessary
for that particular disability. In an effort to
avoid these problems, some disability provisions
specify the exact crimes for which the statute is
I

As already stated, the material for this article was primarily
drawn from the 302-page study published as the October 1970 issue
of the Vanderbilt Law Review. Entitled "The Collateral Consequences
of a Criminal Conviction," this exhaustive project lists, categorizes
and evaluates the civil disability laws and related judicial developments
in all 50 states, the Federal Government and numerous model acts.
Readers interested in a more complete treatment of the subject, including the many details and exceptions necessarily omitted from this
article, should consult the Vanderbilt Law Review study. Copies of
the Vanderbilt study can be obtained for $2.30, including postage,
by writing the Vanderbilt Law Review, Vanderbilt School of Law,
Nashville. Tenn. 37203.
For purposes of this article, the terms "offender," "convicted offender," "criminal offender," "criminal," and the like generally refer
to persons who have been convicted of a serious crime. Terms such
as "prisoner" and "convict" refer to offenders who are incarcerated.
"Ex-convict" refers to offenders who have been released from a correctional institution.
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applicable. Civil disability laws also present difficulties when the offender was convicted of a
crime in another state. Although most states do
not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
convictions, a few states apply their civil disability laws only to persons convicted in that state.
The wisdom behind the latter view is questionable
since convicted burglars, for example, present the
same threat to the people of a certain state no
matter where the conviction occurred.
Loss of United States Citizenship
Despite the common belief that the deprivation
of United States citizenship is one of the many
disabilities resulting from a criminal conviction,
the convicted criminal probably does not lose his
national citizenship. Congress has only provided
for denationalization for conviction of serious
crimes involving antigovernment behavior, and
even these narrow provisions are presumably
unconstitutional in view of several recent Supreme
Court decisions. Criminal conviction also will
rarely affect an offender's right to obtain a passport. The passport application merely requires an
applicant to list his conviction for antigovernment
crimes such as treason, and the passport office
makes no independent check of an applicant's
criminal record.
Loss of Right To Vote and Hold Public Office
In most states, citizens convicted of serious
crimes are technically disfranchised in state and
federal elections both during and after confinement in prison. Even where a prisoner is not
legally disfranchised he may still be unable to
vote because of his inaccessibility to voting machinery, including the absentee ballot. Although
the provisions denying convicted citizens the privilege of voting have generally withstood constitutional attack, recent cases, elevating the right
to vote to a preferred right in our system of
government, subject this disability to serious constitutional doubt. Irrespective of the constitutional
challenges, the disfranchise provisions, often disqualifying harmless ex-offenders, are subject to
criticism for their part in preventing the convicted offender from assuming his role as a responsible citizen with a stake in the society in which
he lives.
Criminal conviction may also disqualify a citizen from holding public office. Although the
United States Constitution does not disqualify
a convicted person from holding federal office,

numerous federal statutes exclude persons convicted of certain crimes from holding such positions. It is questionable, however, if many of these
federal statutes will withstand judicial scrutiny
since Congress may not be able to supplement
the qualifications contained in the Constitution.
As a general rule, a person with a criminal
record stands a better chance of qualifying for
a federal office than for a state or local office.
In most states citizens convicted of serious crimes
are directly or indirectly ineligible to hold all
or most state offices. Often these provisions require automatic forfeiture of offices held at the
time of conviction, although a few states require
that the convicted incumbent be impeached before
his office must be vacated.
The provisions making convicted citizens ineligible for public office are designed to protect
the public rather than to punish the criminal. Considering the overly inclusive application of these
statutes, however, the same end could be accomplished by more specific statutes that impose this
disability only when the conviction was for a
crime indicating that the offender would threaten
the public if permitted to run for a public office.
Such provisions would provide the public with
the protection it needs while allowing most released offenders to participate in the civic culture.
It is also arguable that the United States should
adopt the Swedish system of permitting informed
voters to elect the candidate of their choice, irrespective of his criminal record.
Loss of Employment Opportunities
It is no longer disputed that an important factor in the convicted offender's tendency to commit
postrelease crimes is his difficulty in finding legitimate employment commensurate with his ability
and financial needs. Much of this discrimination
is the result of prejudices of private employers
who may even refuse to hire an individual because
of arrests not leading to conviction. The private
employer may also refuse to hire an ex-convict
for a position requiring a fidelity bond because
many fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond
ex-offenders.
The ex-convict faces an even greater barrier
in retaining or obtaining employment requiring
an occupational license than he does unlicensed
employment. The rapidly increasing number of
occupations requiring such licenses aggravates
this problem. Today, for example, occupational
licenses are required for everything from barbers
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to minnow dealers.2 Laws of the Federal Government, every state, and countless municipalities exclude the offender convicted of a serious crime
from holding many of these licenses. While many
of the provisions directly disqualify persons convicted of certain general or specific crimes, other
provisions may indirectly disqualify ex-convicts
by requiring that the applicant possess "good
moral character" or practice "professional" conduct, standards subject to potential abuse against
ex-convicts.
Governments, despite their attempts to rehabilitate convicted persons, also often refuse to
hire ex-convicts. Both federal and state statutes
prohibit persons convicted of certain crimes from
holding various routine governmental positions.
Sometimes the provisions do not require criminal
conviction-an applicant's "immoral conduct"
is a sufficient ground to deny him employment.
Of course, a criminal conviction may constitute
immoral conduct.
These provisions, barring many ex-offenders
from private, licensed, and public employment,
desperately need re-examination. For example,
a law that permits a city to refuse to hire an
ex-convict as a tree trimmer because of his criminal conviction does nothing but detract from
3
efforts to rehabilitate convicted offenders. It
certainly does not protect the public from any
significant threat. Public employers must begin
to set an example for private employers by hiring
and training ex-convicts. In addition, private
employers should be encouraged to employ exoffenders through such federally sponsored programs as fidelity bonding and tax-incentives, and
licensing standards must be made more realistic
and specific. If anything, in many cases the public
is overprotected and actually harmed by unnecessary or excessively restrictive licensing provisions that do not require a determination of the
suitability of this individual for this license.
Loss of Judicial Rights
Frequently, the American judicial system convicts the criminal then reminds him of the
conviction whenever he voluntarily or involuntarily becomes a participant in that system. In
a few states, for example, the prisoner cannot
bring a suit in his own name. Even where he can
maintain a suit in his own name, often he must sue
E.g., Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 29. § 822 (Supp. 1970-71).
Atencio v. Rossmiller, Civil No. C-1493 (D. Colo., January
1970).
9 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-833
(1962).
,- E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 17, H§ 1252(c),

1279(c),

& 1333

13,

(1962).

through a personal representative who is appointed to protect the prisoner's interests.
Although prisoners in some states lose their
capacity to sue during imprisonment, in all states
suits can be maintained against prisoners. In
most states, however, the prisoner is not permitted to appear personally to defend himself. Many
states authorize the appointment of a trustee to
manage the affairs of prisoners. In these states
the trustee can sue in the prisoner's behalf.
Taking a surprisingly modern, approach to this
problem, Arkansas provides by statute that judgment cannot be rendered against a prisoner until
a defense has been entered for him by a retained
4
or appointed representative.
In some states, criminal conviction may substantially impair the offender's right to execute
and enforce valid legal instruments, including
wills. For example, a few states, adhering to a
strict view of the ancient civil death concept,
deny the convict the right to enter all or certain
contracts, or prohibit him from enforcing the
contracts he makes. These statutes do nothing
but frustrate the inmate's successful rehabilitation as is illustrated by the fact that in some of
these states it is questionable if a convict could
enter a legally enforceable contract for a correspondence course to improve his education.
Just as criminal conviction does not usually
impair the offender's right to contract, it also
rarely makes him incompetent to serve as a witness in a judicial proceeding. If his conviction is
for perjury or a related offense, however, in a few
states he is automatically precluded from testifying. Even when the convict can testify in court,
his conviction is usually admissible to impeach
his credibility. Perhaps it would be best to limit
the use of a criminal conviction for impeachment
purposes to crimes involving a falsehood or
breach of trust.
Although many criminal convictions are the
result of a jury verdict, in most states an offender
convicted of a serious crime is not permitted to
serve as a juror. A few states even disqualify
persons under indictment for certain crimes. The
statutes often follow no logical pattern. In Pennsylvania, for example, some counties disqualify
from jury service persons convicted of a "felony,"
while other counties bar persons convicted of a
crime involving "moral turpitude. ' 5 The courts
disagree whether a new trial is required when
a jury contains an ex-offender who should have
been disqualified from jury service.
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Just as the criminal offender may have difficulty serving as a juror, he may also be disqualified from serving as a court-appointed fiduciary,
such as an executor, administrator, trustee, testamentary guardian, or guardian ad litem. Unlike
the juror qualification statutes, the former offender under this disability is usually disqualified
because of the judge's wide discretion in making
or approving the appointment. It is submitted
that too many judicial officials automatically exclude ex-convicts from these positions of trust,
irrespective of the circumstances and the evidence of rehabilitation.
Loss of Domestic Rights
Perhaps nothing is as detrimental to the rehabilitative efforts of correctional personnel as
the disintegration of the prisoner's family. Unfortunately, present laws and practices discourage
convicted offenders from obtaining or retaining
strong family ties. Some state statutes even attempt to prevent certain offenders from beginning
families. For example, a few states, evidently
assuming that criminal tendencies are congenital,
prohibit the marriage of habitual criminals."
Moreover, the laws of at least nine states authorize the sterilization of specified offenders.
Similarly, most states make criminal conviction
or imprisonment a ground for divorce. An offender's conviction may also cost him his children.
Even if his parental responsibilities are not lost
as part of a divorce decree, a parent's incarceration may bring him within the purview of state
statutes authorizing the termination of parental
rights if a child is found neglected or dependent.
In some states a parent's criminal conviction may
also permit the adoption of his children without
his consent.
Although it is submitted that incompatible
families should not be forced to stay together, it
must be recognized that the state has an interest in promoting the family ties of convicted
offenders. The laws should focus on methods of
encouraging, not discouraging, these ties. A start
in this direction can be achieved through variations of work release and family visit programs
where prisoners and their families are permitted
to live together under appropriate conditions. Increased use of family counseling would also help.
These efforts will be only of limited success, however, until the existing statutory scheme is
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-07 (Supp. 1969); Va. Code Ann. § 20-46
(Supp. 1970): Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.030 (1961).

altered to reflect the important and neglected
policy of preserving the prisoner's family relationship.
Loss of Property Rights
Criminal conviction may cost the offender his
property as well as his family. Modern statutes
that affect the offender's property rights had their
origin in the common law concept of attainder
which resulted in the forfeiture of the convict's
land and chattels. Paralleling restrictions on attainder in the United States Constitution, a large
majority of the states have substantially abolished
the feudal doctrine. Consequently, in the United
States, property divestment upon criminal conviction is a limited and almost nonexistent practice. At least three states, however, have enacted
express divestment statutes which restrict the
life convict's retention or inheritance of property.
Theoretically, these statutes are designed to protect the life convict's creditors or spouse.
The convicted person's capacity to acquire
property by inheritance is governed entirely by
state statutes of descent and distribution. As a
general rule, the convicted offender retains the
right to inherit from anyone. The major exception
to this rule is contained in "slayer's statutes"
which preclude an offender from inheriting from
the person he is convicted of feloniously killing.
In addition to the rule that the killer cannot inherit from his victim, some jurisdictions do not
permit a spouse guilty of abandonment or nonsupport to inherit from the innocent spouse. Of
course a prisoner may suffer from a technical
reading of this type of statute.
Many convicts lose their home, land, and other
property since they are unable to supervise their
business interests while in prison. As a result of
this financial loss, they are subject to severe rehabilitative setback. They may suffer the psychological frustrations that result from their inability to control what is rightfully theirs and
therefore lose some incentive to return to the
outside world. One method of circumventing this
restriction on a convict's economic activity and
alleviating the resulting hardship on the prisoner
and his family is through the appointment of a
representative to act for him. Eighteen states
have specific statutory provisions for the management of the inmate's estate by the appointment
of a guardian, trustee, or committee. Many of
these laws, however, provide only a limited degree of protection since they apply only to spec-
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ified classes of convicts and to relatively few
situations.
Loss of Insurance, Pensions, Workman's
Compensation Benefits
A criminal conviction, imprisonment, or involvement in criminal activity can have a substantial impact upon the ability of an offender
to obtain, enforce, or benefit from a life insurance
policy. Most major life insurance companies refuse to insure a convict because the company is
uncertain about his future prospects for rehabilitation. After the inmate's release from prison,
however, few companies will automatically deny
him life insurance merely because of his conviction. Most companies make the decision
whether to issue life insurance to ex-convicts after
considering such factors as the gravity, proximity, and amount of violence involved in the
offense, the likelihood of return to crime, the
demonstrated degree of rehabilitation, and the
number of convictions.
A more restrictive policy prevails when the
ex-convict attempts to procure automobile insurance. Automobile insurance underwriters often
deny policies to applicants with criminal records because of the contention that the existence
of an insured's criminal record prejudicially
affects the insurer's chance of defending a claim
against its insured. It is noteworthy, however,
that insurers have not been able to supply the
states with the underwriting statistics necessary
to support this assumption. The convicted offender
who is denied regular automobile insurance
may have to resort to other means of obtaining
coverage. For example, "high risk" insurance
and the assigned risk plan available in most states
provide the necessary coverage at significantly
higher rates.
Criminal conviction may affect an offender's
pension just as it affects his insurance. Many
offenders who fulfill the statutory requirements
of age and years of service for public pension
benefits may nevertheless be precluded from
participating in a pension fund. The Federal
Government and at least 18 states directly disqualify some government employees convicted
of various offenses from participating in annuity,
pension, or retirement programs. The Federal
Government has extended this principle to recipients of Social Security. In the absence of a
S Fromm v. Board of Directors of Police and Firemen's Retirement
System. 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963).

direct disqualification provision, a criminal conviction may still deprive the offender of pension
benefits on the basis of general formulas requiring honorable and faithful service as a precondition to the receipt of pension benefits. As in
the employment situation described above, the
unconfined discretion vested by these general
standards often leads to harsh results. In a recent
case, for example, a police officer forfeited his
disability pension benefits when he was convicted
of a misdemeanor that he had committed during
his employment.7 As a result of this minor conviction, for which he was fined only $100, the
pension board permanently discontinued his
disability payments of over $346 per month.
A worker's receipt of workman's compensation
benefits may also be adversely affected by his
criminal conviction. At the present time only two
states use the recipient's criminal conviction as
grounds for terminating his workman's compensation benefits for preconviction injuries. However, the offender is not as fortunate when he
sustains an injury while working in prison, even
though he was required to perform the task which
caused his injury. Although federal prisoners are
usually compensated for their inprison injuries,
a majority of the states do not provide for such
compensation. By so immunizing themselves from
liability, these states encourage unsafe working
conditions and poor treatment of -prisoners by
supervisory guards. Since many prison industries
perform valuable work for the states, the denial
of benefits to convict-employees may be likened
to a form of indentured servitude.
Restoration of Civil Rights and Privileges
Although most states provide procedures for
terminating some or all civil disabilities some
time after the offender's conviction, it is submitted that the existence of meaningful relief
from the collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction is more illusory than real. Yet, the
necessity of a ceremony terminating the stigma
and disabilities conferred by a criminal conviction is recognized as an important rehabilitative
mechanism markedly absent from the present
process. One method presently available in many
states for the restoration of rights is a pardon
by the governor. This act of executive grace, however, is a vacuous and unrealistic alternative for
all but the few ex-offenders having the necessary
political connections. Even if an ex-convict is able
to secure a pardon, many courts rule that the
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acceptance of a pardon constitutes an implied
confession of guilt that does not obliterate the
conviction. Thus, the presumably fortunate exconvict receiving an executive pardon may still
be disqualified from occupational and professional
licenses that, by statute, can be issued only to
persons without criminal records.
Realizing the weaknesses of the pardon procedure, at least 13 states have adopted automatic
restoration procedures. Enacted to facilitate the
restoration of an offender's civil rights and to
make the administration of restoration more
efficient and economical, these procedures restore
the offender's civil rights automatically upon
fulfillment of certain conditions, such as completion of the prison sentence, probation, or parole.
Unfortunately, since automatic restoration is
usually construed by courts as tantamount to a
pardon, the procedure generally does not restore
the ex-convict's eligibility to receive an occupational or professional license, despite the evidence
of rehabilitation.
The most enlightened and penologically progressive method of restoration now in exsistence
is contained in expunction or annulment procedures adopted by about a quarter of the states.
Both kinds of statutes are designed to restore
forfeited rights and uplift the offender's status
by exonerating him from the fact of his conviction
and concealing the conviction from the public
view. Although. subject to restrictive interpretation in the licensing and occupational areas,
these procedures are presently the most effective
in allowing ex-convicts to escape their past record.
Restorative relief in states without automatic
restoration, expunction, or annulment procedures
is governed by miscellaneous provisions in which
an administrative board, the judiciary, or the
legislature is vested with the power to restore
civil rights. In an attempt to unify these myriad
procedures, several model restoration acts have
been proposed, each reflecting the belief that the
extant procedures are too cumbersome, costly,
or unrealistic.
Constitutionality of Civil Disabilities
The recent extension of constitutional guarantees to students, welfare recipients, and prisoners
lends encouragement to the possibility that the
judiciary will more fully recognize the constitutional infirmities that infect most civil disaStephans v. Yeomans. Civ. No. 1005-70
* 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
8

(D. N.J. Oct. 30. 1970).

bility statutes. Susceptible to broadside constitutional challenges, civil disability laws have
recently been invalidated in two important cases.
Both cases are noteworthy for their utilization
of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to strike down civil disability laws. In one
case a federal court overturned the New Jersey
voting disability statute, which estabilished arbitrary classifications of disabling crimes.5 After
reviewing the erratic and haphazard history of
the statute, the court observed that "it is hard to
understand why Bill Sikes should be ineligible
for the franchise and Fagan eligible." The court
was referring to the New Jersey statute's senseless classification which disfranchised persons
convicted of blasphemy, polygamy, or larceny
over $6, but did not disfranchise those convicted
of fraud, tax fraud, bribery, embezzlement, attempted murder, kidnapping, bomb-carrying, or,
like Fagan in the court's reference to Oliver
Twist, receiving stolen property. It is relevant
to note that many of the Nation's civil disability
statutes are as inartfully drawn and equally subject to constitutional attack.
The second important disability case is Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Commission,9 in which a federal court enjoined the
New York State Athletic Commission from denying a former heavyweight champion renewal of
a license to box because of his conviction, still
under appeal, for refusal to be inducted into the
armed forces. The court relied on the plaintiff's
extensive investigation which revealed that the
Commission had customarily granted licenses to
other offenders, many of whom had been convicted of rape, arson, burglary, and other crimes
involving moral turpitude. Armed with this decision as a precedent, future lawsuits in behalf
of ex-convicts based on investigations of licensing or occupation commissions' files may expose
the arbitrary and capricious policies employed
by these commissions in refusing ex-convicts
legitimate work opportunities.
Fruitful constitutional challenge may also be
predicated on the due process and cruel and unsual
punishment provisions in the constitution. By
raising the standards of fairness, rationality, and
proportionality of punishment embodied in these
guarantees, law suits may markedly limit both
mandatory and discretionary disabilities. It has
been argued persuasively, for example, that barring entrance to the legal profession for a drug
or selective service conviction is an unconstitu-
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tional denial of due process because the offense
was neither rationally nor directly connected to
the functions of the occupation. Extending this
principle of rational and direct connection to
ex-convict applicants for all public jobs and
licenses could prevent many of the injustices
perpetrated against ex-convicts in the job market.
Civil Disabilities and Modern Corrections
Although, as previously noted, the law does not
technically exact the price of citizenship for the
commission of a crime, relating this seemingly
happy fact to offenders is a difficult and almost
embarrassing task when the long list of forfeited rights and privileges are recounted in the
same breath. An inmate's typical response is:
"What good is it for me to be a good citizen
when society will not treat me like one?" This
valid yet perplexing question epitomizes the
negative impact the forfeiture of rights and
privileges has on the rehabilitation of the
offender. By implicitly sanctioning community
attitudes of mistrust toward all offenders, whether
law-abiding or not, civil disabilities are at war
with the basic concepts of rehabilitation theory.
Although the imposition of civil disabilities is
felt less by the inmate than the releasee, the
convict's knowledge of the loss of certain rights
may deprive him of the incentive to start his life
anew. A recent survey found that convicts were
overwhelmingly aware of the effect their conviction would have on future job opportunities.
The debilitating influence of civil disabilities
on the offender is vastly magnified upon his release. Civil disabilities discourage the ex-convict
from participating in normal community life by
restricting him from activities routinely performed by other members of the community. By
thus denying the offender access to the norms of
community living, civil disabilities retard his full
socialization into the law-abiding community and
produce attitudes of rejection and estrangement
from the very institutions that foster development of lawful conduct. It has been demonstrated,
for example, that disfranchisement of minority
groups often increases their feelings of alienation and frustration. Similarly, depriving exconvicts of the symbolic power of the vote may
decrease their desire to participate in a society
"' See Schrag, The Correctional System:
381 Annals 11 (1969).

Problems and Perspectives,

that gives them no voice in changing oppressive
and archaic policies that affect their lives.
Civil disabilities also operate as a causative
factor in the social degradation of the ex-convict
by promoting what one writer has termed the
"management of status" in the community.
According to this theory, community attitudes
prevent convicted offenders from attaining the
same station in life as those persons without
a criminal record, everything else being equal.
Civil disabilities visibly mark the offender as
automatically unworthy and unfit for the performance of certain functions. This badge helps
to shape society's concept of the lawbreaker and
demonstrates to the offender that he is not free
to pursue an ordinary life. Until this machinery
of status management is dismantled, the imposition of civil disabilities will remain an arbitrary
societal control over the status of convicted
persons.
Recommendations and Conclusions
Substantial reform of the disability schemes
in all states and the Federal Government is imperative before full rehabilitation of criminal
offenders can be achieved. In addition to the need
for uniformity among jurisdictions, remedial
action of a threefold nature is required. First,
the entire scheme of civil disabilities must be
re-examined and restrictions that are not necessary to protect the public must be eliminated.
Secondly, existing provisions that call for the
blanket application of disabilities must be replaced by procedures whereby a convicted person
will lose only those rights and privileges that are
related to the criminal offense to the extent that
the offender's exercise of a function would pose
a direct, substantial threat to society. Thirdly,
imaginative measures are needed to ensure that
the disabilities imposed are removed as soon as
the-convict's rehabilitative progress indicates this
action is warranted.
It is recognized that neither the adoption of
these recommendations nor the total elimination
of civil disabilities will free society from crime
and recidivism. But it may help. The crime rate
will remain unacceptably high until ex-convicts
re-establish themselves as productive members
of a nonretributive community. To the extent
that civil disabilities impede this progress, they
must be reassessed and revamped to conform to
modern theories and methods.

